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REHABILITATING LAWYERS:
PERCEPTIONS OF DEVIANCE AND ITS
CURES IN THE LAWYER REINSTATEMENT
PROCESS
Bruce Green* & Jane Campbell Moriarty**†
ABSTRACT
State courts’ approach to lawyer admissions and discipline has not
changed fundamentally in the past century. Courts still place faith in
the idea that “moral character” is a stable trait that reliably predicts
whether an individual will be honest in any given situation. Although
research in neuroscience, cognitive science, psychiatry, research
psychology, and behavioral economics (collectively “cognitive and
social science”) has influenced prevailing concepts of personality and
trustworthiness, courts to date have not considered whether they
might change or refine their approach to “moral character” in light of
scientific insights. This Article examines whether courts should
reevaluate how they decide whether to allow lawyers to return to law
practice after suspension or disbarment for impermissibly deceptive
conduct. The Article describes courts’ traditional approach, discusses
some of the relevant scientific literature, and suggests some possible
* Louis Stein Chair and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
University School of Law.
** Carol Los Mansmann Chair in Faculty Scholarship, Professor of Law and
Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, Duquesne University School of Law.
† The authors thank Dan Ariely for reviewing this Article and Daniel Langleben,
Leslie Levin, and Alex Kranjec for helpful comments on a draft. They would also
like to thank the participants at the Louis Stein Center for Law & Ethics at Fordham
University School of Law conference on Julius Henry Cohen at which a draft of this
Article was first presented. The authors also thank Brandon Herring for excellent
research assistance.
This Article references various social and cognitive science articles and books.
Neuroscience, cognitive science, research psychology, and behavioral economics all
contribute to current understandings about personality and behavior. While we are
not experts in any of these fields, we believe that insights from those disciplines,
based upon widely-cited, peer-reviewed publications, might be valuable to explain
lawyers’ deviance and its possible cures. Any errors, of course, are the authors’
alone.
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reasons why courts appear not to have considered such scientific
insights. The Article concludes with some thoughts about the utility
of the role of scientific research in the disciplinary process.
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to the conference on Julius Henry Cohen’s book, The Law:
Business or Profession?, the authors of this Article began a discussion
about lawyers who commit serious wrongdoing resulting in
suspension or disbarment. Many of those lawyers sought readmission
at some later point and we wondered whether those lawyers were
demonstrably better people by the time they sought readmission to
the practice.
We were particularly interested in those lawyers who engaged in
serious deceit: impulsively stealing clients’ money, swindling people in
investment schemes, or profoundly deceiving clients about
fundamental aspects of cases (such as whether a complaint was even
filed). We did not focus on lawyers suffering from disabling
depression or wrestling with a substance disorder that may have
explained their misbehavior, but on those whose deceptive behavior
was not readily explicable, perhaps not even to themselves.
Our first inquiry was why lawyers jeopardized their livelihoods by
engaging in serious dishonesty. Were these bad-acting lawyers always
corrupt, or was their dishonesty anomalous? The research led us to
consider whether honesty is a relatively stable personality trait, as
many presume, or whether generally honest individuals are capable of
serious dishonesty. We also wondered how courts decide whether
lawyers suspended or disbarred for dishonest acts are worthy to
return to practice. We were not confident that courts had a solid grip
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on either why people committed such deceptive acts or whether they
were reformed. These conversations were the antecedents for this
Article, which was prepared in connection with a conference on Julius
Henry Cohen’s 1916 book, The Law: Business or Profession?
Cohen’s book provides a window into how courts, assisted by bar
associations, handled misconduct and discipline in the early twentieth
century. It turns out that nearly one hundred years later, despite
remarkable advances in all aspects of cognitive and social science,
courts proceed much the way they did in Cohen’s day—they rely on
aphorisms and intuition to decide whether lawyers are ethically fit to
practice.
In this Article, we examine the process of suspension, disbarment,
and readmission in light of some twentieth and twenty-first century
scientific knowledge. We begin by looking at professional discipline a
century ago, during Cohen’s time. Joining the chorus of those who
question “character” as immutable and predictable, we then consider
more contemporary cases in which courts decide that lawyers are
sufficiently rehabilitated and investigate how courts make such
decisions. Focusing on the concept of deception, we sketch out some
of the insights that cognitive and social sciences offer on the subject.
We ask whether science may illuminate the problems of
understanding, predicting, and preventing deceptive behavior.
Finally, we discuss possible reasons why courts have eschewed help
from those outside the legal profession to understand deceptive
behavior, choosing instead to carry on as they have done for over a
century. Our modest proposal is that in keeping with twenty-first
century thought, a useful first step might be to systematically collect
and analyze data on a large-scale basis to find out what happens to
lawyers who are reinstated after disbarment or suspension.
I. A CENTURY OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE: DEVIANCE AND
REHABILITATION
Writing almost a century ago from his perspective as a leader of the
New York bar, Julius Henry Cohen depicted the attorney disciplinary
process as playing a central role in how the legal profession justifies
and defines itself. Cohen opened his 1916 book, The Law: Business
or Profession?,1 with a chapter titled “Disbarment,” setting forth his
view, which he illustrated by describing the attorney disciplinary
process in New York City and summarizing cases in which lawyers
1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916).
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were sanctioned for misconduct. Cohen touted the collaboration of
“the Bench and Bar” in the process.2
Cohen
envisioned
a
reciprocal
relationship
between
professionalism and discipline. On the one hand, to maintain the
practice of law as a profession, it was essential to have professional
regulation. The profession must enunciate high standards of conduct
for the public’s protection and “purge” itself “of those who fall below
the standards.”3 On the other hand, a robust, well-functioning
disciplinary process required lawyers’ willing participation, which
would not be forthcoming absent a sense of commitment to the law as
a profession. Cohen warned: “Take away the conception of the
practice of law as a profession—make it a business—and at once you
destroy the very basis of professional discipline.”4
Cohen was describing the formal disciplinary process in its infancy,
coinciding with the rise of bar associations.5 State courts had
exercised authority to admit lawyers to practice, announced standards
of conduct, and disbarred or otherwise sanctioned lawyers for
violating those standards.6 Although courts had limited resources to
devote to the disciplinary role, informal regulation within small,
2. Id. at 23 (“The community is interested—vitally interested in knowing that
wrongdoing on the part of its lawyers is more readily ascertained and more quickly
punished than any other wrongdoing in the community.”).
3. Id. at 22–23.
4. Id.
5. New York City’s Association of the Bar was founded in 1870. See About the
New York City Bar Association, N.Y.C. B. ASS’N, http://www.nycbar.org/aboutus/overview-about-us (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). Other bar associations arose around
the same time. The New York State Bar Association was founded in 1877. See N.Y.
ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). The American Bar
Association was founded in Saratoga, New York, in 1878. See History of the
American
Bar
Association,
ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/utility/
about_the_aba/history.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). And the Rochester Bar
Association (now the Monroe County Bar Association) was founded in 1892. See
About the Monroe County Bar Association, MONROE COUNTY B. ASS’N,
http://www.mcba.org/AboutUs/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). The New York County
Lawyers’ Association, in which Cohen became a leading figure, was founded in 1908
in response to other bar associations’ exclusionary policies. By the 1890s, New York
courts began to turn to local bar associations to initiate and prosecute disciplinary
proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of Dorthy, 44 N.E. 1123 (N.Y. 1896) (disciplinary
prosecution by the Rochester Bar Association); In re Mashbir, 45 N.Y.S. 1144 (App.
Div. 1897) (disciplinary prosecution by the Association of the Bar).
6. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation
of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 73 (2009). Criminal prosecutors have also served a
regulatory role in situations where lawyers’ misconduct crossed criminal lines. See
generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 327 (1998).
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homogenous local bars may have helped fill the gap until immigration
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the growth
of elite urban bars.
Courts began to delegate disciplinary authority to state and local
bar associations. For example, New York’s intermediate appellate
court authorized the Grievance Committee of New York City’s
Association of the Bar to investigate and prosecute New York City
lawyers and conduct disciplinary hearings, subject to that court’s
review.7 Participating lawyers volunteered time and bar associations
contributed the operating costs.8 These efforts gave Cohen and
others reason to claim pride in the law as a self-regulating profession.
The contemporary disciplinary process directly descended from the
one Cohen described and his contemporaries would recognize it.9
The process still exists to adjudicate claims of lawyer misconduct and
impose sanctions ranging from censure or suspension to disbarment
for misconduct. The objective remains largely to purge the profession
of those who cannot be trusted to uphold the professional standards
in the future. The need for good decisions about misbehaving lawyers
has never been more important. Complaints against lawyers for
ethical violations continue unabated and surveys among lawyers
themselves suggest perhaps a greater willingness to engage in forms
of deceptive practice.10
Although the organized bar’s role has been eliminated in many
states, lawyers still dominate the process. In New York, for example,
disciplinary prosecutions are now conducted by full-time staff lawyers
functioning as an arm of the state intermediate appellate court, but
volunteer lawyers still review evidence and make recommendations.
7. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1870-1970, at 351–71
(1970). For a discussion of a disciplinary proceeding from Cohen’s era, see Bruce A.
Green, Criminal Defense Lawyering at the Edge: A Look Back, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
353, 375–86 (2007).
8. COHEN, supra note 1, at 4–5, 20–21.
9. For a discussion of the evolution of lawyer disciplinary systems, see Mary
Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911 (1994). Among the many insightful studies of the
contemporary disciplinary process are: RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:
LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008) [hereinafter ABEL,
LAWYERS IN THE DOCK]; RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL (2010) [hereinafter
ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL]; Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales
About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(1998).
10. See Professor Ross’s survey data on lawyers’ willingness and acceptance of bill
padding, discussed infra at note 84.
OF THE
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In the federal district courts of New York, the bar takes a greater
role: volunteer lawyers are appointed on an ad hoc basis to serve as
disciplinary prosecutors. Lawyers do not have exclusive authority to
regulate themselves, but they may still stake a claim to be members of
a substantially “self-regulating” profession.11
One might expect that over the period ranging from Cohen’s time
to the present, courts would have developed an increasingly
sophisticated understanding of lawyer deviance, not only from
deciding many cases, but from following developments outside the
field of attorney discipline. But in fact, how courts decide which
sanctioned lawyers should be allowed to resume the practice of law
has not significantly evolved over the past century.
When deciding whether to admit applicants to the bar, state
judiciaries insist that successful applicants must possess good moral
character, and the question of character returns to center stage once a
suspended or disbarred lawyer seeks to return to practice. In this
respect, courts’ decision-making about discipline and reinstatement
remains virtually unchanged from their approach a century ago
during the time of Julius Henry Cohen.
Focusing on fairly
predictable factors such as remorse and claims of rehabilitation,
judges make seemingly intuitive decisions about whether a
candidate’s “good character” has been restored. Courts assume that
a lawyer’s “character” determines and predicts her behavior in both
her personal and professional life; that a lawyer’s character is
relatively constant but that some who engage in misconduct because
of deficient character can later be rehabilitated (i.e., they can change
and improve their character); and finally, that courts can differentiate
between the changed and the unchanged. Although science has
progressed in explaining behavior in the intervening century, courts
have made virtually no use of insights from other disciplines in
structuring their disciplinary decision-making.
In light of the wealth of information about human behavior that
has developed since Cohen’s time, we explore whether scientific
insights can be useful to courts in the reinstatement process. We
narrow our inquiry to lawyers who were sanctioned for conduct
involving deception, a recurring subject in disciplinary proceedings.
Drawing on social and cognitive science, we note that contrary to
courts’ oft-stated beliefs, deceptive behaviors—at least at low levels—

11. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1147 (2009).

GREEN&MORIARTY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/15/2013 5:47 PM

REHABILITATING LAWYERS

145

are more widespread than believed.
Although only a small
percentage of people are consistently and dangerously dishonest,
most people are dishonest to some degree.12
As Deborah Rhode’s seminal work on character in the admissions
and disciplinary processes would suggest,13 the idea that lawyers have
a consistent and honest “character” is essentially flawed. We believe
that courts’ predictions about whether readmitted lawyers will
reoffend are based on little more than guesswork. While cognitive
and social science insights may not make these predictions much
easier, they may offer ways to understand and curb dishonest
behavior in the profession generally and in readmitted lawyers
specifically.
II. THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM: ASSUMPTIONS,
OBJECTIVES, AND DECISION-MAKING
The courts’ stated objectives in disciplining lawyers have remained
constant since Cohen’s day:14 to protect clients, courts, and the public
from lawyers who cannot be trusted to abide by professional
standards in the future.15 Disciplinary sanctions are not expressly
intended to be punitive or to serve as a deterrent, although in reality
those may often be courts’ principal objectives in imposing them.
An evaluation of the lawyer’s present “character” often serves as a
proxy for a prediction about whether the lawyer in question will
transgress again in the future.16 The determination mirrors one made
in the admissions process, which weeds out candidates (in small
numbers) whose prior behavior suggests that they are likely to engage
in professional misconduct.17 As the principal goal of the disciplinary
12. See discussion infra in Part III: “Cognitive and Social Science Insights into
Lawyer Dishonesty.”
13. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94
YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
14. Lawyer discipline may serve additional, unarticulated objectives. See
generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 675 (2003).
15. COHEN, supra note 1, at 4 (“It is our duty to . . . protect the State and the
public from lawyers who prostitute the authority given to them for personal gain by
imposing on or defrauding their clients or the tribunals which are instituted to
administer the law and protect those whose rights and interests are committed to
their care.” (quoting Matter of Flannery, 135 N.Y.S. 612, 614 (App. Div. 1912))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. See, e.g., D.C. Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 147 (D.C. 1975).
17. See, e.g., Matter of Wiesner, 943 N.Y.S.2d 410 (App. Div. 2012). In Cohen’s
day, lawyers were instructed to “aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the
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function is to prevent harm rather than punish misconduct, courts
often suspend or disbar lawyers even for misconduct committed
outside their professional role, including for criminal or dishonest acts
in their personal dealings.18 Courts believe that personal wrongdoing
denotes a dishonest or law-breaking character that will equally
influence the lawyer’s professional conduct.
Courts assume that individuals possess either good (e.g., honest or
law-abiding) character or bad character, and that character is a
general predictor of future conduct. Thus, those with dishonest
character, even in their personal lives, are more likely to act
dishonestly in professional dealings. Courts envision good character
to be an essential element in regulating the profession and protecting
the public.19

profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education.” ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 29 (1908) (quoted
in COHEN, supra note 1, at 331). The seminal work on the use of “moral character”
in the attorney licensing process in the United States is Rhode, supra note 13. For a
history of the use of “moral character” in this process, see Carol M. Langford,

Barbarians at the Bar: Regulation of the Legal Profession Through the Admissions
Process, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193, 1196–1208 (2008). For a discussion of the role of
“character” in Canada’s admissions process, see Alice Woolley, Tending the Bar: The
“Good Character” Requirement for Law Society Admission, 30 DALHOUSIE L.J. 27
(2007). For additional commentary, see Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights:
Understanding the “Good Moral Character” Examination for Bar Applicants, 40
AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007); Matthew A. Ritter, The Ethics of Moral Character
Determination: An Indeterminate Ethical Reflection Upon Bar Admissions, 39 CAL.
W. L. REV. 1 (2002); Keith Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession’s
Good Moral Character, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1037 (2008); Richard R. Arnold, Jr.,
Comment, Presumptive Disqualification and Prior Unlawful Conduct: The Danger of
Unpredictable Character Standards for Bar Applicants, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 63, 99;
Maureen M. Carr, Note, The Effect of Prior Criminal Conduct on the Admission to
Practice Law: The Move to More Flexible Admission Standards, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 367, 384–85 (1995); Marcus Ratcliff, Note, The Good Character
Requirement: A Proposal for a Uniform National Standard, 36 TULSA L.J. 487
(2000).
18. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592, 597–98 (1874) (“[W]hen an attorney
commits an act, whether in the discharge of his duties as attorney or not, showing
such a want of personal or professional honesty as renders him unworthy of public
confidence, it is not only the province but the duty of the court, upon a proper and
legitimate presentation of the case, to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. . . .
He has by his own misconduct divested himself of qualifications that were
indispensable to the practice of his profession; and while he may regard the judgment
depriving him of that right as a punishment for the offense, the action of the court is
based alone upon the ground of public policy and for the public good.”).
19. Rhode, supra note 13, at 507–08. While decisions concerning admission and
readmission differ in various ways, we believe that there is substantial overlap in
decision-making in both categories.
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We question these assumptions. As Professor Rhode and other
scholars explain, character is an amorphous concept and courts’
decisions about it lack uniformity.20 The Supreme Court has similarly
commented on the difficulty of defining character, noting that the
term is “unusually ambiguous” and “can be defined in an almost
unlimited number of ways for any definition that will necessarily
reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer.”21
Historically, the use of character as a requirement for admission to
the bar has implicated issues of status, social class, race, and gender.22
Professor Rhode illustrates the problem with reference to the first
National Bar Examiners Conference in 1933, at which it was noted
that “sometimes you have wonderful character evidence displayed
even though the applicant is not well educated or his parents were
born in Russia.”23 At times, character has been a thinly veiled
justification to limit the admission of immigrant groups, women,
minorities, or those who belonged to unpopular political groups, such
as the communist party.24 Finally, even if we are able to agree on a
definition of character, there is little reason to believe that good or
bad character is either consistent or predictable in most given
individuals.25
If one were to accept the significance of “character” as a consistent
state, a rational approach to discipline would be permanently to
disbar every lawyer who is found to have engaged in serious
misconduct, on the theory that the lawyer probably lacks the requisite
character to practice law and the lawyer’s character is unlikely to
change. Most courts have not adopted this approach, presumably
20. Id. at 529–32; see also Ritter, supra note 17, at 11 (commenting that the
criteria for “moral fitness to practice law . . . has remained notably indeterminate”).
21. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).
22. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 499–503.
23. Id. at 500–01 (citing Character Examination of Candidates, 1 B. EXAMINER 63,
72 (1932) (quoting George H. Smith)). Pertinent to our discussion, researchers at the
University of California, Berkeley and the University of Toronto found a strong
correlation between social class and unethical behavior. Contrary to the suggestions
from the early twentieth century, the relationship correlates higher social class with
unethical behavior. See Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased
Unethical Behavior, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4086, 4088 (2012), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/11/4086.full.pdf (concluding that the pursuit of selfinterest, which is a fundamental motive among the elite in society, is associated with
increased desire for wealth and status, which can promote wrongdoing).
24. Accord Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 267; Rhode, supra note 13, at 499–503;
Swisher, supra note 17, at 1040–44.
25. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 559 (“The situational nature of moral conduct
makes predictions of behavior uncertain under any circumstances . . . .”).
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considering it too harsh,26 although a handful of states have adopted
permanent disbarment rules that prohibit the disbarred lawyer from
ever seeking readmission.27 Most states permit reinstatement after
disbarment, which generally results in a lengthy suspension rather
than permanent banishment from the practice. In those states, the
courts attempt to strike a balance between protecting the public from
“bad” lawyers—i.e., those who are likely to re-offend—and the
interest in readmitting those for whom past misconduct was
aberrational.
This leads to the challenge at the heart of professional regulation:
how can courts or their surrogates predict which individuals who
offend are likely or unlikely to re-offend? In the disciplinary process,
this question might be raised at either of two stages. It might be
raised when the lawyer is initially sanctioned for misconduct, but is
more likely raised when she seeks reinstatement or readmission.28
Most states require lawyers who have been suspended for a
significant period to prove they have the requisite character to
practice law.29 Likewise, in most states, lawyers who are disbarred are
not permanently excluded from the profession but after a substantial
period of time may seek readmission.30 In either case, the sanctioned
individual will have the burden of proving he or she has been

26. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in a reinstatement
proceeding, “[a] fundamental precept of our system is that persons can be
rehabilitated. . . . [That] redemption is possible and valuable is both well established
in law and premised upon long-standing, even ancient traditions.” In re Ellis, 930
N.E.2d 724, 726 (Mass. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. For a more detailed discussion of permanent disbarment, see Brian
Finkelstein, Comment, Should Permanent Disbarment Be Permanent?, 20 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 587, 590–91 (2007). See also James R. Zazzali, The Whys and Hows of
Permanent Disbarment: New Jersey’s Wilson Rule, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311,
337 n.224 (2008) (listing states that have permanent disbarment rules).
28. For a collection of decisions on reinstatement and readmission, see generally
M. C. Dransfield, Reinstatement of Attorney After Disbarment, Suspension or
Resignation, 70 A.L.R.2d 268 (1960).
29. See ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROF’L SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS B.2.3, B.2.10 (2005). The result is that, in reality, the length of
suspension tends to be significantly longer than the period of suspension established
by the court. Many suspended lawyers wait longer than required to appear for
reinstatement, and the period of time required successfully to navigate the
reinstatement process adds additional time. See generally Brian K. Pinaire et al.,
“Philadelphia Lawyers”: Policing the Law in Pennsylvania, 2012 ABA J. PROF. LAW.
137.
30. See ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROF’L SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS B.2.2, B.2.10 (2005).
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rehabilitated.31 Thus, courts have opportunities to make predictions
about lawyers’ future conduct and could develop data about whether
their predictions prove correct and what considerations predict future
disciplinary misconduct. If they chose to, courts could learn from the
data.
In fact, courts do not make predictions about sanctioned lawyers’
future conduct as often as one might expect. At the initial
sanctioning stage, courts often avoid the question of whether the
lawyer is likely to re-offend, because an appropriate sanction can be
determined without regard to this question. The disciplinary process
serves secondary purposes, aside from public protection, such as to
identify and condemn conduct by lawyers that transgresses the
profession’s norms.32 Consequently, lawyers may be sanctioned for
misconduct without regard to the likelihood that they will engage in
future misconduct. When a lawyer engages in egregious misconduct,
the court may disbar the lawyer simply to express the extent of the
court’s disapproval or to ensure public confidence in the legal
profession. Administrative and proportionality considerations may
also allow courts to avoid delving into lawyers’ propensity to reoffend.
If the lawyer’s wrongdoing was merely technical,
unintentional, or in an area of legal ambiguity, the court may impose
a trivial sanction in the belief that the misconduct was so minor that
there is no reason to question the lawyer’s character and that
suspension or disbarment would, in any case, be excessive.33
31. See, e.g., In re Lord, 910 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. 2006) (“Petitioner has . . . [the] burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that his resumption of the practice of law
at this time would not have a detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the
bar, the administration of justice or the public interest, and that he has the moral
qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice
law.”). See generally Kimberly A. Lacey, Note, Second Chances: The Procedure,
Principles, and Problems with Reinstatement of Attorneys After Disbarment, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1117 (2001). As both a legal and practical matter, the burden
is probably higher on those seeking readmission after disbarment than those seeking
reinstatement after suspension. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L
CONDUCT 101:3012 (citing In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297, 300 (S.D. 1997) (“[A] court
should be slow to disbar, but it should be even slower to [readmit] . . . .”)).
32. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 4 (“It is our duty to condemn conduct that tends
to impair or defeat the administration of justice or degrade the usefulness of the
profession.”).
33. The professional conduct rules might be read as reflecting an assumption that
certain misconduct, by its nature, has no bearing on a lawyer’s character. Lawyers
must generally report non-confidential knowledge of another lawyer’s disciplinary
violation, but only if the misconduct “raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2012).
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Even when the lawyer’s propensity to commit future misconduct
seems to be important, the court may impose a sanction allowing it to
bypass the question of character. Suspending the lawyer has the
practical effect of requiring that individual to demonstrate the
requisite character as a condition of reinstatement. In New York, for
example, any lawyer suspended for longer than six months must apply
for reinstatement, as would be true of a disbarred lawyer seeking to
practice law.34 The lawyer is placed in professional purgatory but is
not cast out of the profession permanently. The suspension might be
read as an expression of agnosticism about the lawyer’s character,
which is in part why a lawyer concerned about his reputation would
much prefer it to disbarment. The court need not express a judgment
about the lawyer’s character and propensity to engage in future
misconduct unless and until the lawyer seeks reinstatement.
Presumably, many lawyers who were suspended for significant
periods or disbarred never seek to regain their law licenses because,
for example, they have moved on to other pursuits, doubt that they
could resume law practice successfully, or think it unlikely that they
can make a compelling application.
Because courts may avoid or defer character determinations, their
disciplinary decisions can be ambiguous as to whether the court is
predicting that the lawyer in question will re-offend. A lengthy
suspension or disbarment may reflect a judgment that the lawyer
poses a future risk of professional misconduct, but these sanctions
may simply reflect a decision that harsh punishment is necessary for
other reasons, or that the character determination is best left
unresolved. On the other hand, courts sometimes do make character
judgments, if only implicitly. A censure or a short suspension for
misconduct that could have merited a more serious sanction
presupposes that the court regarded the misconduct as aberrational.
This practice was as true in Cohen’s day as today. In addition to
describing instances in which lawyers were disbarred or suspended
because of serious misconduct committed either within or outside the
practice of law,35 Cohen described two instances in which lawyers
were merely censured for significant misconduct,36 apparently based

34. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.14(3) (2012).
35. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 3–4.
36. Cohen discusses Matter of Lauterbach, 155 N.Y.S. 478 (App. Div. 1915),
which involved a senior commercial lawyer, once a candidate for national office, who
was censured. COHEN, supra note 1, at 5; see also id. at 21 (discussing lawyer who was
ordered to cease practicing law unless he repaid money wrongly obtained from a
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on judgments that the individuals in question were unlikely to offend
again. Not surprisingly, it appears that both lawyers treated
sympathetically by the disciplinary authorities (and Cohen) were
members of the professional elite.
In contrast, at the reinstatement or readmission stage of the
disciplinary process, it would seem more difficult to dodge the
question of the applicant’s “character” or likely future conduct.
Conventionally, the individual seeking to resume the practice of law
must demonstrate “rehabilitation”37—that is, that the character flaws
that led to prior misconduct have now been corrected.38 Underlying
this requirement are the assumptions that at least some individuals’
characters are mutable and that the courts are capable of discerning
those whose character has improved.
Even in the post-sanction process, courts may avoid predicting
whether the applicant can be relied on to follow the rules. The court
may deny a motion for reinstatement or readmission for reasons
independent of the applicant’s propensity to commit misconduct. The
prior misconduct may have been so egregious that public respect for
the profession would be diminished by restoring the lawyer’s license
even if the court itself was confident in the lawyer’s rehabilitation.39 It
may also be that the possibility of recidivism, however small, may be
unacceptable because the court and the profession would be
embarrassed if the readmitted lawyer re-offended. But in this
context, courts cannot systematically avoid making judgments.
Especially when suspended lawyers seek reinstatement, courts,

client, and who was then loaned the money to make the repayment by a lawyer
engaged in the disciplinary process).
37. See, e.g., In re Wigoda, 395 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ill. 1979) (“Rehabilitation, the
most important consideration in reinstatement proceedings, is a matter of one’s
‘return’ to a beneficial, constructive and trustworthy role.”).
38. At least in theory, an alternative approach might be to seek to convince the
court that prior misconduct was an aberration—i.e., that the lawyer has possessed
good character all along. This is unpromising for several reasons, including that
courts presume that serious misconduct is an expression of bad character. Courts
may dismiss applicants as lacking necessary candor or insight if they say that they
have always possessed good character and have no explanation for their aberrational
bad acts. Further, lawyers cannot ‘plead in the alternative.’ As discussed below, full
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and contrition are considered preconditions of
rehabilitation. A claim that serious misconduct was simply an inexplicable aberration
may be viewed as a minimization of one’s misconduct.
39. See, e.g., Hughes v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of
Tenn., 259 S.W.3d 631 (Tenn. 2008) (denying readmission because of the nature of
the prior misconduct, even though applicant had the requisite character to practice
law).

GREEN&MORIARTY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

152

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

4/15/2013 5:47 PM

[Vol. XL

having implicitly left the door open to the lawyer’s reinstatement,
must sometimes decide whether the applicant now has the requisite
character to practice law.
Many courts do not seem to explicitly engage the question of the
applicant’s likely future conduct; rather, they content themselves with
determining whether the applicant has proven he is of current good
moral character by considering his behavior since disbarment.40 It is
possible that courts realize the complicated and often erroneous
nature of predicting future behavior and choose to examine current
known conduct instead. However, as courts believe that the
prediction of future behavior (such as dangerousness) is a subject
appropriate for courtroom analysis,41 something else may be at issue
here.
It appears that courts consider proof of other factors—such as
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and remorse—as evidence of
improved character.42 And if character has improved, courts seem to
assume—rightly or wrongly—that such good character will continue.
One might expect courts to demand that sanctioned lawyers
demonstrate insight into why they acted wrongfully in the past—e.g.,
why they took money from a client’s account, falsified a document,
lied to a client or judge, committed a crime—and what has changed so

40. See, e.g., In re Reinstatement of Wiederholt, 24 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2001)
(determining that the disbarring conduct, the level of remorse and acknowledgment
of wrongdoing, and amount of time passed since disbarment were all critical factors);
see also In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C. 1985) (considering the following
factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney
was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the
misconduct; (3) the attorney’s conduct since discipline was imposed, including the
steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent new ones; (4) the attorney’s present
character; and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to practice
law”).
Massachusetts uses a similar set of criteria:
(1) the nature of the original offense for which the petitioner was disbarred;
(2) the petitioner’s character, maturity, and experience at the time he was
disbarred; (3) the petitioner’s occupation and conduct in the time since his
disbarment; (4) the time elapsed since the disbarment; and (5) the
petitioner’s present competence in legal skills.
In re Ellis, 930 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Mass. 2010). “This test allows the court to
weigh the circumstances concerning the petitioner’s misconduct against his
subsequent actions that show rehabilitation.” Id.
41. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (finding the inability to control
one’s dangerous behavior as grounds for civil commitment following criminal
sentence for sexual violence); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (discussing
future dangerousness in a death penalty hearing).
42. See sources cited supra note 40.
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that they can be counted on not to do the same, or engage in other
misconduct, in the future.43 But published opinions do not seem to
emphasize this,44 and often do not seem to expect it.45
In some cases, it may be clear why the lawyer has changed. He
may have had a substance abuse problem or a serious medical or
psychiatric condition that has since been cured or controlled with
treatment, allowing courts to believe he is essentially a changed
person.46 In many cases, however, there will not be such a ready
explanation for why the lawyer previously violated professional
standards or why he can be trusted not to do so again. What
explanations will persuade the court? The case law does not reveal
any clear theory of how lawyers become rehabilitated. Perhaps
courts are unwilling to be too explicit for fear that they will be giving
insincere lawyers a blueprint for how to regain admission. But the
43. This requirement may be an important element in deciding that lawyers are
again fit for the practice. Making individuals more self-aware (being called upon in
public to account for one’s behavior, for example) can “heighten awareness of
discrepancies between behavior and salient personal standards, creating pressure to
act in accordance with standards.” C. Daniel Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy:
Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
525, 529 (1999).
44. See In re Reinstatement of Wiederholt, 24 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2001); See, e.g.,
In re Reinstatement of Grier, 737 A.2d 1076, 1084 (Md. 1999) (Raker, J., dissenting)
(criticizing court’s reinstatement of lawyer, in part, because his responses to questions
demonstrated “a lack of insight into the underlying problems that brought him to the
attention of the Attorney Grievance Commission in the first place”).
45. See, In re Reinstatement of Grier, 737 A.2d at 1084 (Raker, J., dissenting); In
re Reinstatement of Ramirez, 719 N.W.2d 920, 921 (Minn. 2006) (in determining
whether to reinstate a disbarred lawyer, “the court considers proof of moral change,
the attorney’s recognition of wrongful conduct, the length of time since the
misconduct and disbarment, the seriousness of the original misconduct, the attorney’s
physical or mental illness or pressures that are susceptible to correction, and the
attorney’s intellectual competency to practice law”). But see In re Kerr, 675 A.2d 59,
65 & n.1 (D.C. 1996) (noting that disbarred lawyer “sought to develop insight into
her own psychology, so as to assure that the past transgressions are not repeated”).
46. See, e.g., Mullison v. People, 61 P.3d 504, 510 (Colo. 2002) (readmitting a
disbarred lawyer whose professional misconduct was attributable to drug abuse upon
finding that the applicant “ha[d] undergone a fundamental character change” by
recovering from his drug addiction, engaging in community service, and
acknowledging and expressing sincere remorse for his misconduct). On the general
problems of substance abuse and mental illness in the legal profession, see J. Nick
Badgerow, Apocalypse at Law: The Four Horsemen of the Modern Bar—Drugs,
Alcohol, Gambling and Depression, 18 PROF. LAW. 1, 2 (2007); Jon Bauer, The

Character of the Questions and the Fitness of the Process: Mental Health, Bar
Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 UCLA L. REV. 93 (2001);
Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s Willful
and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589
(2008).
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professional literature and informal conversations with lawyers
working in the disciplinary process also do not reveal any theory.
Courts do identify two preconditions for rehabilitation:
acknowledgement of the prior misconduct and remorse.47 There may
be room for disagreement about whether the lawyer’s
acknowledgment is sufficiently full, or whether the lawyer has
understated the extent of his or her misconduct, its seriousness, or its
consequences. Likewise, there may be room for disagreement about
whether expressions of contrition are sufficiently sincere. Both of
these preconditions call for subjective determinations.
Courts also identify various types of circumstantial evidence from
which they may infer that rehabilitation has occurred. At minimum,
the applicant must have refrained from misconduct during the period
of suspension or disbarment.48 Literally “getting religion” may be
viewed as an affirmative indication of reform.49 Good, charitable
works during the period of suspension or disbarment are also among
the indicia. But a cynic might wonder how much weight these
deserve. “Character” may not be as unvarying as courts sometimes
assume—e.g., one can abide by high personal standards but low

47. Compare Wiederholt, 24 P.3d at 1226 (denying a disbarred lawyer’s
reinstatement, finding that lack of remorse, failure to accept responsibility, and
minimization of prior misconduct made it likely that he would reoffend) with In re
King, 868 P.2d 941, 943 (Ariz. 1994) (reinstating a suspended lawyer who “accepted
absolute responsibility for his actions, and exhibited sincere remorse”).
48. See In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 1979) (denying a disbarred
lawyer’s readmission where he “has not conducted himself in a manner to induce the
confidence of this court in his professional morality. His conduct continues to be
tainted by misrepresentations, flagrant disregard for the sanction of disbarment, and
lack of appreciation for the ethical code governing attorneys.”). A national study of
state disciplinary processes published by the ABA in 1970 identified, among other
deficiencies, undue liberality in readmitting disbarred lawyers. The study highlighted
the subjectivity of courts’ and disciplinary agencies’ approach to the question of
rehabilitation. For example, one bar president conceded that he did not know what
rehabilitation meant in the disciplinary context, as distinguished from the theological
context in which it “implied an acknowledgement of the commission of sin, a contrite
heart, a true spirit of repentance,” and observed that “[a]s nearly as I can figure by
our procedures, rehabilitation means that for some period of time following
disbarment the man has not been in trouble.” ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION
OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 153 (1970).
49. See Meiklejohn v. People, No. 10PDJ113, 2011 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 7, at *16
(Colo. 2011); Lefly v. People, 167 P.3d 215, 218 (Colo. 2007). Cohen envisioned
professional regulation in similarly theological terms. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 1,
at 23 (“[F]or sinning, the punishment is certain.”); id. at 42 (a lawyer “is a member of
his profession” with “the unpleasant task of segregating his weak and sinning
brothers from the rest of the community”).
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professional ones.50 Moreover, even a formerly bad lawyer who wants
to resume practicing could dedicate some time to joining a church or
performing good works. Courts rely on the testimony of reputable
character witnesses as another indication.51 None of this says
anything about differences in the mental processes of those who act
wrongly and law-abidingly, how those processes can be transformed,
and how one ascertains whether transformation has occurred.
The dearth of discussion about why lawyers commit wrongdoing
and how they can change reflects the basically intuitive and subjective
nature of courts’ inquiry. There is little effort to explain, for example,
what kind of insight a lawyer is expected to have into his or her
reasons for initially engaging in misconduct and how his or her
thinking must change to prevent similar behavior in the future. There
is also little explanation of how courts can detect opportunists who
engage in good works and other charitable endeavors, not for
altruistic motivations, but simply to develop a record to present to the
court. Finally, courts do not appear to make efforts to collect or
analyze data about recidivism by reinstated and readmitted lawyers.
The result is that judges, or lawyers to whom courts delegate
authority, appear to place significant weight on their untested moral
intuitions.
III. COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS INTO LAWYER
DISHONESTY
While the contemporary disciplinary process has not changed
fundamentally since Cohen’s day, the fund of scientific knowledge
about behavior has increased significantly. Courts have simply
ignored the scientific developments in personality theory from the
last century, choosing to cling to “good character” as its defining
standard.52
We wonder how different the reinstatement and
readmission processes might look if courts considered social and
cognitive sciences. In undertaking this inquiry, we focus on lawyer
dishonesty rather than on all species of misconduct. In exploring
whether dishonesty is constant and predictable, we do not propose

50. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1979) (“A person may, as
Petitioner here, be well regarded by friends, refrain from smoking and drinking,
participate in church activities, and yet lack a sense of professional rectitude.”).
51. See, e.g., In re Groshong, 413 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ill. 1980); Ex parte Marshall,
147 So. 791, 792 (Miss. 1933); see also In re Johnston, 162 P.3d 922 (Okla. 2007); In re
Stapleton, 880 A.2d 1213 (Pa. 2005).
52. See supra Part II.
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sweeping and concrete reforms of the disciplinary process but simply
explore the significance of its essential conservatism: might the courts
be missing out on an opportunity to do better?
If one hopes to focus on a particular wrongdoing or a particular
trait, deception is a sensible place to start. The concept is less vague
and bias-laden than “bad character” and most of the decisions to
disbar lawyers involve acts of deception: the lawyer steals or
“borrows” money from a client without consent,53 secretly acts against
the best interest of the client,54 lies about critical work alleged to be
completed on the client’s behalf,55 takes advantage of a client in a
deceptive manner,56 intentionally misleads a court,57 or commits a
felony which by its nature includes some element of deception.58
While some lawyers are suspended or disbarred solely for neglect of
multiple matters due to substance abuse issues or depressive events,
many of those cases involve the lawyer deceiving the client about the
state of the cases.59

53. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Agiliga, 31 A.3d 103 (Md.
2011) (disbarring attorney who commingled and appropriated client funds).
54. See, e.g., Orr v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 355 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. 2011) (attorney
permanently disbarred after forging clients’ names to sell property, fabricating the
names of people to whom he claimed to have sold property, lying about his actions,
converting the money to pay personal debts, and misleading bar investigators).
55. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Shomber, 227 P.3d 157 (Okla. 2009)
(attorney charged clients for work she never performed or performed in a grossly
negligent matter, gave clients false information about the status of their cases, and
never returned unearned fees).
56. See, e.g., In re Bark, 72 So. 3d 853 (La. 2011) (disbarment warranted when
lawyer encouraged clients and others to invest in his fraudulent scheme).
57. See, e.g., In re Clark’s Case, 37 A.3d 327 (N.H. 2006) (disbarring an attorney
for making a false statement in a bankruptcy filing on behalf of a client). “The
privilege of practicing law does not come without the concomitant responsibility of
truth, candor, and honesty. Because no single transgression reflects more negatively
on the legal profession than a lie, attorney misconduct involving dishonesty justifies
disbarment.” Id. (quoting In re Young’s Case, 913 A.2d 727 (N.H. 2006)).
58. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Zaccagnini, 955 N.E.2d 977 (Ohio 2011)
(disbarring attorney who was convicted of conspiring with partner to obtain more
than twenty-one million dollars in commercial appraisal contracts).
59. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 950 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 2011)
(suspending an attorney for two years for failing to perform work, misrepresenting
the status of work, and purchasing cocaine with fees); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v.
Beasley, 142 P.3d 410 (Okla. 2006) (suspending an alcoholic lawyer who took money
and did not perform work, deceived clients about the state of their cases, did not
communicate with clients, and failed to respond to bar inquiries).
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Many cognitive and social scientists (as well as philosophers) claim,
contrary to common understanding, that humans are very good liars.60
And while most of us believe we are essentially honest and value
honesty as a virtue,61 it turns out that nearly everyone lies frequently,
spontaneously, and often unconsciously.62 Research consistently
suggests that across various populations and professions, many people
do cheat a little in fairly predictable ways—which would likely include
all the lawyers with good character.63 Finally, while people are good
liars, they do not seem to be good lie detectors: the average person’s
ability to detect deception in a face-to-face interaction with another
individual may be only modestly better than chance.64 That inability
likely extends to judges deciding whether those seeking readmission
have changed their ways.
Deception is often separated into two categories: pro-social lies to
maintain social norms, such as those designed to avoid awkwardness
and unkindness;65 and self-oriented lies intended to benefit the liar: to
increase his wealth or position, avoid punishment, or obtain some
60. See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE
TO EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES (2012); DAVID LIVINGSTON SMITH, WHY
WE LIE 12–13 (2004); ALDER VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2d ed. 2008); Daniel D. Langleben, & Jane C. Moriarty, Using
Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law & Policy Collide, PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing studies); Sean A. Spence et al., A

Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: Evidence from Functional
Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B. 1755, 1755–62 (2004). The length
of this Article precludes an in-depth discussion of the deeper philosophical concepts
of truth and dishonesty that undergird any exploration of the subject. Rather, our
focus is primarily on published experimental studies performed in the last several
decades.
61. Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of SelfConcept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 633–34 (2008) (citing multiple
studies about views of honesty).
62. See SMITH, supra note 60, at 15; VRIJ, supra note 60, at 22 (collecting studies
on the frequency of lying and concluding that lying is a fact of everyday life and
occurs frequently).
63. ARIELY, supra note 60, at 238 (“[A]ll of us are perfectly capable of cheating a
little bit.”). His study notes, however, that bankers cheated more than junior
politicians—by a margin of two-to-one. Id. at 243.
64. Paul Eckman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 913, 913–20 (1991); accord VRIJ, supra note 60, at 141–88 (collecting
and discussing studies about the accuracy rates of lay persons in detecting truth and
deception). There may be disagreement about whether these studies accurately
match real-life decisions. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor,
Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2567–71 (2008) (discussing studies).
65. As the late neuroscience researcher Sean Spence pointed out, “precisely
truthful communication at all times would be difficult and perhaps rather brutal.”
Spence et al., supra note 60, at 1756.

GREEN&MORIARTY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

158

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

4/15/2013 5:47 PM

[Vol. XL

benefit.66 Deception is an ability that develops naturally during
childhood and only individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders
(e.g., autism) do not develop this ability,67 which suggests that
deception may be an essential aspect of human functioning.
The disciplinary system approaches the seriousness of and reasons
for deception by focusing on the degree of harm to the victim or the
profession.68 To date, to the best of our knowledge, no one has been
disciplined for lying about one’s height in an online dating site69 or for
other minor misrepresentations. In the last few decades, the
disciplinary system has declined to bring disciplinary charges against
philandering lawyers—although this was not always the case.70 Some

66. VRIJ, supra note 60, at 19. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, collected dozens of reasons for lying:
Saints may always tell the truth, but for mortals living means lying. We lie to
protect our privacy (“No, I don't live around here”); to avoid hurt feelings
(“Friday is my study night”); to make others feel better (“Gee you've gotten
skinny”); to avoid recriminations (“I only lost $10 at poker”); to prevent
grief (“The doc says you're getting better”); to maintain domestic
tranquility (“She's just a friend”); to avoid social stigma (“I just haven't met
the right woman”); for career advancement (“I'm sooo lucky to have a
smart boss like you”); to avoid being lonely (“I love opera”); to eliminate a
rival (“He has a boyfriend”); to achieve an objective (“But I love you so
much”); to defeat an objective (“I'm allergic to latex”); to make an exit
(“It's not you, it’s me”); to delay the inevitable (“The check is in the mail”);
to communicate displeasure (“There's nothing wrong”); to get someone off
your back (“I'll call you about lunch”); to escape a nudnik (“My mother's
on the other line”); to namedrop (“We go way back”); to set up a surprise
party (“I need help moving the piano”); to buy time (“I’m on my way”); to
keep up appearances (“We're not talking divorce”); to avoid taking out the
trash (“My back hurts”); to duck an obligation (“I've got a headache”); to
maintain a public image (“I go to church every Sunday”); to make a point
(“Ich bin ein Berliner”); to save face (“I had too much to drink”); to humor
(“Correct as usual, King Friday”); to avoid embarrassment (“That wasn't
me”); to curry favor (“I've read all your books”); to get a clerkship (“You're
the greatest living jurist”); to save a dollar (“I gave at the office”); or to
maintain innocence (“There are eight tiny reindeer on the rooftop”).
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674–75 (9th Cir. 2011)
67. Spence et al., supra note 60, at 1755 (citing studies).
68. Again, this intuitive judgment may be misguided. As small forms of deception
are successful, the deceiver may be buoyed by the success and move to greater
misdeeds.
69. People frequently lie by exaggerating their own physical attributes in
matchmaking contexts. See Zoe Chance et al., Temporal View of the Costs and
Benefits of Self-Deception, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15655, 15655 (2011) (citing
studies).
70. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of Hartford Cnty. Bar v. Broder, 152 A. 292
(Conn. 1930) (disbarring attorney for adultery, which was then a felony). Broder was
convicted and sent to prison. In deciding whether disbarment was appropriate, the
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legal misrepresentations are also labeled acceptable forms of deceit,
even by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which exclude
certain deceptive statements related to settlement of a case.71
On the other hand, many types of dishonesty are dealt with harshly
in both the criminal and disciplinary systems. When lawyers
intentionally mislead the court72 or their clients,73 such conduct may
result in severe penalties, including the loss of one’s license to
practice.74 Misappropriating funds from clients is most often a
disbarring offense and in some states will lead to permanent
disbarment (colloquially termed a “professional death penalty”).75
Dishonest acts culminating in a felony conviction may result in
disbarment and convictions for perjury often result in disbarment, as
occurred when Vice Presidential Chief of Staff and Presidential
Assistant, I. Lewis Libby, was convicted of that crime.76 But between
social lies and perjury convictions lies vast acreage.

Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that “adultery was conduct involving moral
turpitude, and, under our law, an infamous crime, since the penalty might be
imprisonment in the state’s prison. It was indicative of . . . ‘moral unfitness for the
profession’ . . . .” Id. at 294. Having sexual relations with clients, however, is grounds
for professional discipline in many states. See ABA MODEL RULE PROF’L CONDUCT
1.8(j) (2012) (“A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a
consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer
relationship commenced.”).
71. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2012) (“Under
generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily
are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the
subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a
claim are ordinarily in this category . . . .”).
72. See, e.g., In re Clark’s case, 37 A.3d 327 (N.H. 2012) (disbarment appropriate
for intentionally misleading the Bankruptcy court).
73. Orr v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 355 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. 2011) (attorney permanently
disbarred after forging clients’ names to sell property, fabricating the names of
people to whom he claimed to have sold property, lying about what he had done,
converting the money to pay personal debts, and misleading bar investigators); In re
Bark, 72 So. 3d 853 (La. 2011) (disbarment warranted when lawyer encouraged
clients and others to invest in his fraudulent scheme); State ex rel. Counsel for
Discipline of Neb. Sup. Ct. v. Bouda, 806 N.W.2d 879 (Neb. 2011) (lawyer disbarred
after engaging in an elaborate series of misrepresentations to his client, stealing
money, and neglecting matters causing a capias to be issued for his client’s arrest).
74. See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. 2008) (disbarring lawyer who had
arranged a job interview for an in-house position with a non-existent corporation for
a judicial law clerk to convince her to provide evidence the lawyer could use in a
motion to disqualify judge).
75. Zazzali, supra note 27, at 318 (discussing the New Jersey rules that
permanently disbar lawyers for misappropriating funds).
76. See In re Libby, 945 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 2008) (disbarring I. Lewis (“Scooter”)
Libby upon conviction for perjury and related crimes). Libby was convicted of
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Many lawyers engage in deceit that raises serious concerns about
fitness to practice: how many lawyers “cheat a little” on their taxes,
pad their hours “a bit,” or lie to clients about how well the lawyer
actually performed in hearing when the client was not there?
Apparently the government collected about three hundred billion
dollars less in taxes paid than in taxes owed, due to underreporting.77
Lawyers are undoubtedly represented in this group. Given that
nearly all are dishonest to some degree, is there a bright line between
essentially honest and essentially dishonest? Although courts seem to
operate on the assumption of such a bright line, we are less sanguine
on the subject.
One theory of why those who consider themselves honest commit
acts of dishonesty is that they balance the risks and rewards of the
dishonesty against an internal view of self that is affected by the value
system around them.78 People’s innate level of honesty can be
affected by the mores of those with whom they interact.79 Consider
this slight twist on a social science experiment: If the government left
pencils on the tables in the courtroom, would you take a few with you
when you left? Would you do the same thing if you were at your
colleague’s desk writing a note? Would you take a quarter off her
desk? While there are many possible answers, we assume that some
lawyers would take the pencils from the courtroom but would be
loath to take their colleague’s pencils and would never even consider

violating 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006) (providing that perjury is punishable by fine or by
imprisonment of not greater than five years). See also Matter of Reid, 512 N.Y.S.2d
114 (App. Div. 1987) (disbarring an attorney upon conviction of perjury in New York
state court, violating Penal Law § 210.15).
77. Mazar et al., supra note 61, at 633.
78. Id. at 634.
79. Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior:
The Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 397 (2009)
(discussing the results of studies to determine the effect of peer influence on
unethical behavior and finding that a group’s willingness to engage in dishonesty may
increase when a member of the group to which participants identify commits an act
of dishonesty); accord ARIELY, supra note 60, at 246 (concluding we “catch”
dishonesty from others). Leslie Levin also addresses how peers influence attorneys’
ethical norms, exploring the interaction between social psychology and attorney
discipline. See Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking:
Lessons from Psychology and From Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1549, 1556–59 (2009) (explaining how lawyers’ ethical views are informed by those
with whom they interact frequently); see also ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK, supra
note 9; Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Small Firm and Solo Practitioners, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 376–81 (2004) (discussing the relationship between psychological
processes and ethical practice).
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taking the money. Taking something from an identifiable person
feels like “stealing,” as does filching the quarter.80
Our conceptions about honesty are also influenced by peers and
what has become accepted practice. Many people who are dishonest
to some degree in paying taxes or puffing up their work-related
expenses still think of themselves as honest, believing they are doing
what is socially acceptable,81 akin to “puffing” in negotiations. Thus,
our sense of moral behavior is affected by both common practice and
the moral compasses of those with whom we associate.82 This may
explain, for example, why some lawyers pad their hours, overbill, or
double bill.83 According to Professor Ross’s 2006–2007 survey, over
30% of lawyers who responded double-billed; more than 30%
“recycled” work from one client and charged the second client; and
most lawyers believed that padding bills occurs on a regular basis.84
According to Professor Ross, the number of lawyers engaged in such
behavior has increased significantly while the number who find the
behavior morally objectionable has decreased substantially between
his 1995–1996 survey and the more recent one.85 There is often

80.
81.
82.
83.

See Mazar et al., supra note 61, at 634 (using a related hypothetical).
Id. at 643.
See Gino et al., supra note 79, at 397–98; Levin, supra note 79, at 1555–56.
For discussions of the problem, see, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking:
Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 208,
208–09 (1999); Douglas R. Richmond, A Few Dollars More: The Perplexing
Problems of Unethical Billing Practices by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV. 63, 66–67 (2008).
84. William G. Ross, Billing Ethics Survey for Attorneys, WILLIAM G. ROSS,
http://www.williamgeorgeross.com/pdfs/phpESP%20v1%207_with%20omissions%20
for%20posting.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). Professor Ross notes on his website
that between the 1995-1996 survey and the 2006-2007 survey, lawyers’ belief that such
behavior was unethical also decreased. See William G. Ross, Attorney Billing
Surveys, WILLIAM G. ROSS, http://www.williamgeorgeross.com/surveys.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013).
85. Professor Ross concludes about the survey:
[A]pproximately two-thirds of the respondents to the 2006-07 survey and
1995-96 surveys stated that they had specific knowledge of bill padding.
Moreover, the attorneys who responded to the most recent survey seemed,
on the whole, to be less ethical in their billing practices than those who
responded to the earlier surveys. For example, 54.6 percent admitted that
the prospect of billing additional time had at least sometimes influenced
their decision to do work that they otherwise would not have performed,
compared with only 40.3 percent in the 1996 survey. Similarly, the
percentage of attorneys who admitted that they had engaged in “double
billing” rose from 23 percent in 1996-96 to 34.7 percent in 2006-07. The

percentage of the attorneys who believed that this practice was unethical fell
from 64.7 percent in 1995-96 to only 51.8 percent in 2006-07, even though
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substantial pressure to increase billable hours, and as more lawyers in
a given firm engage in dishonest behavior, the behavior itself
becomes more regularized and feels less immoral. Perhaps lawyers
are “catching” the cheating bug from their colleagues.86 Research
suggests that the “ethical climate and ethical culture are important
predictors of the frequency of unethical acts within groups and
organizational settings.”87
With the example of solo practitioners being over-represented in
the disciplinary system,88 one may theorize that the absence of any
group to disapprove of improper behavior may be part of the reason
lawyers can engage in the self-deception necessary to engage in
professional misconduct. Since positive peer pressure helps keep
people honest, perhaps the lack of positive peer pressure negatively
affects behavior as well.
For most of us, our conscience, formed in part internally and in
part by our environment, governs the extent and degree of our
deceptive behavior. Most people are neither unnaturally honest nor
wholly dishonest; we all fall somewhere on a spectrum and various
factors may affect our behavior, including pressures encountered and
the perceived risk of detection. Thus, predicting the likelihood of a
given individual’s deceptiveness in the future is a complicated and
possibly futile task.
There are undoubtedly groups of people who do fall outside of the
normal range on the deceptive/honest continuum and easily engage in
serious dishonesty involving vast sums of money or others’ property.
For example, psychopaths—a very small fraction of the
population89—routinely engage in deception: “Psychopaths use

this practice has been condemned by the American Bar Association and
most commentators who have discussed the issue.
See William G. Ross, Attorney Billing Surveys, WILLIAM G. ROSS,
http://www.williamgeorgeross.com/surveys.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (emphasis
added).
86. See ARIELY, supra note 60, at 191–216.
87. Gino et al., supra note 79, at 397.
88. Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of
Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 847, 847–48 n.3 (2001).
89. Psychopathy is generally estimated at roughly one percent of the general
population. ROBERT D. HARE, Psychopaths and Their Nature: Implications for the
Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems, in PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL,
CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 196 (Theodore Millon et al. eds., 1998). Robert
Hare, a leading expert on the subject, has defined psychopathy as a “constellation of
affective, interpersonal, and behavioral characteristics, including egocentricity;
impulsivity; irresponsibility; shallow emotions; lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse;
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deception to exploit others . . . , and lie more persistently and
blatantly, with considerably more panache than do most other
people.”90 For many years, little research was done on psychopathy in
the non-violent criminal population. Few thought psychopaths were
in the general population, due to their often-extreme behaviors and
predilection for criminal behavior. In the last few decades however,
with the recognition that much white-collar crime and utterly
unacceptable behavior occurs in business and the professions, there
has been renewed interest and research in corporate psychopathy.91
Some of the cases involving disbarment seem to involve such
manipulative, callous and deceptive behavior that it is reasonable to
assume that psychopathy (or another serious personality disorder
involving callous deception) may explain the behavior. But for many
cases involving acts resulting in suspension and disbarment, it is quite
possible the lawyers involved were similar to many lawyers who act
ethically. They just made unethically deceptive choices.

pathological lying; manipulativeness; and the persistent violation of social norms and
expectations.” Id. at 188 (internal citations omitted). While psychopaths are wellrepresented in the violently criminal populations, they are also “well represented in .
. . swindlers and con artists, mercenaries, corrupt politicians, [and] unethical lawyers
and doctors.” Id. at 196. See generally THE PSYCHOPATH: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
PRACTICE (Hugues Hervé & John C. Yuille eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE
PSYCHOPATH] (providing a comprehensive review of current research in the study of
psychopathy).
Psychopathy has substantial overlap with antisocial personality disorder. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR § 301.7 (4th ed. 2000). There are differences between
them, however, that are well beyond the scope of this Article. For a more complete
explanation of the differences, see Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience
Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction, 142
PSYCHIATRY RES. 107, 109 (2006).
We recognize that other forms of personality disorders and mental illness may
explain lawyers’ unethical behavior but mention psychopathy due to its accepted
relation to deception. Barry S. Cooper & John C. Yuille, Psychopathy and
Deception, in THE PSYCHOPATH, supra at 487–503 (discussing how deception is a
critical aspect of psychopathy). For more on the various personality disorders and
mental illnesses that involve deceptive traits, see generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR (4th
ed. 2000); VRIJ, supra note 60, at 30–34 (discussing the relationship of personality
types and deception).
90. VRIJ, supra note 60, at 31 (citations omitted).
91. Paul Babiak, From Darkness Into the Light: Psychopathy in Industrial and
Organizational Psychology, in THE PSYCHOPATH, supra note 89, at 411–28.

GREEN&MORIARTY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

164

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

4/15/2013 5:47 PM

[Vol. XL

It is not just the company lawyers keep that may influence the
honesty; self-deception may also partially explain lawyer deviance.92
While humans are good at lying to other people, we seem to also
excel at lying to ourselves, particularly when the facts conflict with
our self-perception.93 Self-deception is apparently not a conscious
process; we may “lack awareness [of] . . . both the contents and
processes involved.”94 The intriguing concept of self-deception is a
matter of much debate and discussion among philosophers and
scientists.95 We all wonder why we would be so capable of lying to
ourselves about matters small and large but have no conscious
appreciation for engaging in this behavior.
We deceive ourselves for various reasons, some positive and some
not. More favorable hypotheses “are more pleasant to contemplate
than unfavorable ones and tend to come more readily to mind”96 and
most people wish to maintain a positive self-image.97 As Nicholas
Epley and Erin Whitchurch note, “Flattering information about the
self is accepted readily, whereas threatening information is evaluated
more critically and ultimately derogated . . . [which may allow] people
to form a more desirable image of their traits and abilities than reality
might allow.”98 These interpretations of self-deception are largely
92. There are multiple reasons why individuals commit unethically deceptive acts,
as explained by Professor Abel in LAWYERS IN THE DOCK, supra note 9, and
Professor Levin in Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers, supra note 79, at 1555 (discussing the
“various social and psychological processes [that] propel the lawyer down the path to
deviance”). Nonetheless, we focus here on two behaviors we believe are critical.
93. IAN LESLIE, BORN LIARS: WHY WE CAN’T LIVE WITHOUT DECEIT 185 (2011).
94. Ruben C. Gur & Harold A. Sackheim, Self-Deception: A Concept in Search
of a Phenomenon, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 147, 149 (1979). While the
concept of self-deception is much discussed by philosophers and studied by social
scientists, the concept has not yet been tested by cognitive neuroscientists using fMRI
methods. Thus, some argue that self-deception is a just a suggested mechanism that
removes the troubling thought from consideration but that the existence of this
mechanism is still unproven. See, e.g., John R. Monterosso & Daniel D. Langleben,
Homo Economicus’ Soul, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 645, 648–49 (2008) (“We speculate
that brain activity associated with labeling self-signals as unwanted and keeping them
from entering awareness may help distinguish self- from other-deception.” (emphasis
added)).
95. Danica Mijovic-Prelec & Drazen Prelec, Self-Deception as Self-Signalling: A
Model and Experimental Evidence, 365 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B. 227, 228 (2010)
(noting that two thousand years of “speculation and commentary have failed to
exhaust the topic or forge a consensus interpretation”); see also ALFRED R. MELE,
SELF-DECEPTION UNMASKED (2001); Gur & Sackheim, supra note 94.
96. MELE, supra note 95, at 30.
97. See Chance et al., supra note 69, at 15655.
98. Nicholas Epley & Erin Whitchurch, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:
Enhancement in Self-Recognition, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159,
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positive and go a long way to allowing us to live among others as
social animals.
The role of burnishing our self-image cannot be understated.
When asked to evaluate their abilities in comparison to peers, all but
seven percent of college professors believed they were better than
average at their work.99 These results are replicable throughout the
populations in the United States; we are Lake Wobegoners, believing
we are all above average.100 Of course, reality cannot match our
beliefs, but there are some positive reasons for such widespread selfdeception. According to some who study mental health, the betteradjusted see themselves far more positively (and inaccurately) that
those who are depressed; counter-intuitively, it may be the
depressives who see the world more accurately.101 Thus, selfdeception is consistent with mental health “because there are positive
correlations between having these illusions and a positive sense of
self, satisfying social relationships, caring about others, happiness, the
ability to set goals and sustain the motivation and persistence to
achieve them, the ability to cope effectively with setbacks and change,
and productive, creative work.”102
Not surprisingly, self-deception is often not so benign, as is clear
from addiction studies. A primary problem in treating addiction is
the failure of most individuals to recognize the need for therapeutic
help. In fact, “more than 80% of addicted individuals fail to seek
treatment.”103 A common explanation for the failure to self-recognize
addiction is “denial” or self-deception. Given that many addicts
suffer terrible consequences as a partial result of self-deception, it

1159 (2008). In this study, individuals were allowed to select a picture of themselves
that was accurate or had been morphed to be more attractive or less attractive. Id.
Participants were more likely to recognize an attractively enhanced version rather
than their actual photograph. Id. Interestingly, this enhanced recognition applies to
close friends but not to strangers. Id.
99. See SMITH, supra note 60, at 25 (discussing the oft-cited work of T. GILOVICH,
HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO (1991)).
100. See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, FOOLING OURSELVES: SELF-DECEPTION IN POLITICS,
RELIGION, AND TERRORISM 45 (2009); see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 182 (rev. &
expanded ed. 2009) (discussing the “Lake Wobegone effect” of self-deception, also
known as the positivity bias).
101. SMITH, supra note 60, at 27-28.
102. TRIANDIS, supra note 100, at 30.
103. Rita Z. Goldstein et al., The Neurocircuitry of Impaired Insight in Drug
Addiction, 13 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 372, 372 (2009).
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hardly seems like the benign concept described in the preceding
paragraphs.
Self-deception has another decidedly dark side that can be used to
manipulate us into behavior that is harmful to others.104 Lawyers who
engage in deceptive behavior often employ self-deception to allow
them to live an unscrupulous life while simultaneously maintaining a
positive self-image.105 Some social science researchers have termed
this concept “moral hypocrisy,” where one engages in self-deception
to “avoid perceiving discrepancies between their self-serving actions
and their moral standards.”106 The concept of moral hypocrisy—
which operates on an other-than-conscious level—may explain the
situation of otherwise good lawyers committing bad acts.
Self-deception is also used in the deception of others. Shielding
matters from our conscious mind better shields them from others and
thus, the deceiver is less likely to exhibit the stress known to
accompany deception.107 Some theorists posit that deception of
others is intimately linked to our ability to deceive ourselves.108
Lawyers may convince themselves that they are really just
“borrowing” money from their client fund account or that the clients
from whom they steal are really not very good people. These lawyers
use self-deception both to engage in the immoral behavior and to
deceive others.
The social science research collectively suggests that when lawyers
act deceptively, they can convince themselves that the behavior is
acceptable both by using self-deception and by drawing on the moral
beliefs of chosen friends and associates. One could argue that many
lawyers are not terribly different in kind from those who are

104. See, e.g., Batson et al., supra note 43, at 525 (discussing how “people who
sincerely value morality . . . [and value the] interests of others, can act in ways that
seem to show a blatant disregard for the moral principles they hold dear”). In this
study, the authors posit that one way to appear moral to oneself while violating one’s
morals standards is to engage in self-deception. Accord Roy F. Baumeister &
Leonard S. Newman, Self-Regulation of Cognitive Inference and Decision Processes,
20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3 (1994).
105. See Batson et al., supra note 43, at 534–35 (discussing an experiment showing
how people can act unethically and still maintain a view of themselves as moral).
Interestingly, this ability was adversely affected by positioning a mirror in front of the
subjects while they made a choice to be more or less ethical in their decision making.
Id. at 534. Apparently, “seeing yourself” as immoral may affect behavior. Id.
106. Id. at 525–27.
107. See SMITH, supra note 60, at 76 (discussing the work of Robert Trivers).
108. Robert Trivers, The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception, 907
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 114, 115 (2000).
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suspended or disbarred; the latter may just have been more able to
engage in some serious self-deception or are influenced by less-thanhonest companions.109 And social science data suggest various ways
that we can encourage people to be more honest (at least in
studies).110
Perhaps there are ways for judges (and the rest of us) to learn from
the science. But what we still do not know—and on which we believe
that science might provide helpful input—is who will continue to be
unethically deceptive in the future. There is a wealth of social science
and neuroscience that might inform the courts about deceptive
behavior, yet courts continue on much the way they did in the era of
Julius Henry Cohen—believing they can accurately judge character
and that they can predict behavior.
IV. CAN SCIENCE IMPROVE JUDICIAL DECISIONS ABOUT
REINSTATEMENT?
Once admitted to the bar, there is seemingly an assumption that
law graduates are and will continue to be honest.111 When disbarred
or suspended lawyers seek reinstatement, this assumption is no longer
justified. Courts must therefore find ways to determine which past
behaviors are meaningfully correlated with future honesty or future
dishonesty. Cognitive and social science knowledge might prove
helpful to courts.
In some suspension and disbarment cases, the past deception is so
extreme as to raise a red flag: stealing large amounts of money from
clients; forging documents; lying repeatedly to the courts and clients;
and engaging in complicated forms of deception involving various

109. We are excluding from this consideration those lawyers whose mental health
or substance abuse disorders were a primary causative agent in their suspension or
disbarment. The effects of altered thinking due to mental illness or substance abuse
invoke different concerns about rational versus irrational decision making.
110. See, e.g., Batson et al., supra note 43, at 534 (requiring people to watch
themselves in a mirror while acting reduced dishonesty); ARIELY, supra note 60, at
246–54 (suggesting that reminding people about ethical obligations and making
subjects responsible for the acts of others reduces dishonesty).
111. Professor Barnard has made an intriguing proposal that bar admission ought
to be a renewable process, with “360 degree reviews” at various points in one’s
career. Jayne W. Barnard, Renewable Bar Admission: A Template for Making
“Professionalism” Real, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 1 (2001). While it is an interesting
proposal that might well encourage more honest behavior, it seems both complicated
and unlikely to gain traction with the bar.
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parties.112 In short, these seriously deceptive acts seem well outside of
the normal range of dishonesty and deceptiveness.113 The more
extreme cases may indicate that the lawyer has an underlying
personality disorder (such as psychopathy) and poses a continuing
danger to the public if allowed to return to practice.114 Experts on the
subject (such as psychiatrists) might be helpful in alerting courts
about individuals with serious personality disorder, but courts seem
willing to make decisions without the aid of experts, relying largely on
their own experience and intuition in decisions. While their native
practice may be good enough, we believe it might be helpful in
protecting the public to know more, if that is indeed possible, about
who is likely to reoffend. If the public interest is the overarching
concern when deciding whether to reinstate lawyers, then courts
should focus on the factors that are meaningfully correlated with
seriously dishonest behavior.
The cases involving less egregious behavior also pose equally
complicated questions related to future behavior: will the lawyer be
deceptive in future dealings, continue to engage in self-deception so
as to feel good while doing wrong, and seek out colleagues and
companions who will encourage (or will not discourage) bad
behavior? Answering these questions is far from simple, but courts
continue to rely on their own experience and intuition, disregarding

112. There is a range of opinions on what might constitute sufficiently extreme
behavior. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remarked that the crimes
of misappropriating two million dollars and committing perjury were not so egregious
as to bar the court from even considering the petition for reinstatement. See In re
Greenberg, 749 A.2d 434 (Pa. 2000). The court ultimately declined to readmit
Greenberg when he sought readmission nine years after disbarment, finding his
readmission would have a detrimental effect on the standing of the bar and would
subvert the public interest. Id. at 436. But curiously, the court did not find the theft
of two million dollars so egregious as to bar consideration of his petition. Contrary to
some courts, however, Pennsylvania at least gives a nod to considering whether the
severity of the original charge should preclude the court from even considering
reinstatement. Id. at 438. Other courts disagree with that backward-look, finding less
is needed: “A firm resolve to live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation
sufficient to convince a reasonable mind clearly that the person has reformed is only
required. In restoring a disbarred attorney, the principal question is whether that
particular attorney would be safe to assist in administering justice if readmitted . . . .”
In re Holt, No. 2011-BR-00600-SCT., 2012 WL 852654, at *2 (Miss. Mar. 15, 2012)
(quoting Phillips v. Miss. State Bar, 427 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Miss. 1983)).
113. Of course, the data on lawyer discipline might change dramatically if more
lawyers were suspended or disbarred for padding hours.
114. David Thornton & Linda Blud, The Influence of Psychopathic Traits on
Response to Treatment, in THE PSYCHOPATH, supra note 89, at 505 (discussing the
lack of empirical evidence about successful treatment models).
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potential insights from science that might be helpful. Predicting
future behavior is an exceptionally complex endeavor that even
experts often get wrong,115 as is clear from the literature about
predictions of future dangerousness in death penalty hearings and
cases involving the release of sexual predators.116 Rather than relying
on intuitive judgment, courts may benefit from empirical data to
gauge the likelihood of future unethical behavior.117
Although this Article does not suggest any particular way in which
courts should proceed, we do believe that gathering data about
reinstated attorneys might be a useful first step.118 For example, it
would be helpful to know, at a minimum, how many lawyers who are
suspended and permitted to return to practice reoffend, and what
types of original wrongdoing are correlated with future wrongdoing.119
Perhaps the data will reveal that courts do a good job at weeding out
re-offenders. But if we are to take wrongdoing, redemption, and
protection of the public seriously, we need to know whether the
methods used by courts to determine fitness to return to practice are
reliable and valid.120

115. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 559–60 (discussing experts’ inability to predict
future behavior with accuracy).
116. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 928 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting that based upon the opinion of mental health professionals as amici,
predictions of dangerousness are wrong “two times out of three”). According to
social science experts, clinical judgments about predictions of dangerousness are still
quite poor. “Little has transpired . . . to increase confidence in the ability of
psychologists or psychiatrists, using their unstructured clinical judgment, to
accurately assess violence risk.” John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk
Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L.
REV. 391, 406 (2006). See generally Richard Rogers & Rebecca L. Jackson, Sexually
Violent Predators: The Risky Enterprise of Risk Assessment, 44 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 523 (2005) (explaining the complexities and shortcomings of
attempting to predict which sexually violent predators will reoffend); Christopher
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L. J. 275, 283–93 (2006)
(analyzing, inter alia, the benefits and shortcomings of the various predictive
methodologies).
117. Professor Monahan notes that when experts employ risk assessment
instruments with multiple predictor variables, their accuracy increases. See Monahan,
supra note 116, at 409–10.
118. For a detailed discussion about the need for better data in law, see Gillian K.
Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis of Beliefs About the
Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better Data About Law, 14 J.L.
& POL’Y 137 (2006).
119. Data on disciplined lawyers might also be correlated with data on law school
discipline to see whether there is a relationship between them.
120. This is not to say that an empirical study on this issue is not problematic.
First, the degree of lawyer discipline is far below the rate of lawyer misconduct.
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As a separate matter, we also wonder whether social science
discoveries could be helpful to courts in structuring how lawyers
return to practice. For example, studies suggest that reminding
people about their ethical obligations and monitoring their conduct
may help keep them focused on honest behavior, at least in the short
term.121 Requiring lawyers to explain their past behavior and account
for the ethical lapses might be beneficial in preventing future
unethical and deceptive behavior.122 Courts could also consider
monitoring the behavior of reinstated lawyers through the use of a
mentoring system, where reinstated lawyers and an assigned mentor
must check in with the court on a regular schedule.123 Many people in
addiction recovery make use of sponsors to assure continued sobriety
and compliance with sobriety programs. Those with serious mental
illnesses are often required to have periodic consultations with
physicians to assure compliance with medication regimes. In the
criminal justice system, the use of long probationary terms is common
upon release from prison.124 The obligation to meet with a monitor on
a regular basis may help to ensure continuing good behavior. We do
not endorse any of these findings but only offer these insights that
could be helpful to courts.
We do not mean to suggest, however, that cognitive and social
science provide a panacea for the disciplinary system. On the
contrary, there is much disagreement about the proper role of science
Second, lawyers who have a prior suspension or disbarment may not be treated the
same as other lawyers—even small examples of misconduct may generate a greater
response from disciplinary authorities than is the norm. Third, there is no real way to
evaluate courts’ decisions to prevent disbarred or suspended lawyers from returning
to the practice, as that group will be outside the purview of the disciplinary system.
Finally, there will always be problems and disputes around both the accuracy of the
data collection and the meaningful analysis of that data that are common to all such
endeavors.
121. ARIELY, supra note 60, at 39–53 (discussing the prophylactic role ethics
reminders have in reducing cheating on tests, but noting their often short-term
effect).
122. Batson et al., supra note 43, at 529 (claiming that by making individuals more
self-aware—such as being called upon in public to account for one’s behavior—can
“heighten awareness of discrepancies between behavior and salient personal
standards, creating pressure to act in accord with standards”).
123. Professor Barnard’s concept of the “systematic periodic performance
evaluation” for all lawyers dovetails with the concept of monitoring lawyers who
have already been in trouble. See Barnard, supra note 111.
124. In the federal criminal system, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) mandates terms of one to
five years for monitored probation after sentences are concluded. 18 U.S.C.A. §
3583(b) (West 2013); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 (2004)
(sentencing guidelines that suggest long monitored probation after release).
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in the courts.125 Scientific discoveries are often the product of small
laboratory studies that hold little meaning for application outside the
lab. They may be plagued by small sample size, poorly designed
experiments, questionable statistical analysis, or conclusions that
constitute an unwarranted leap from the data generated. Moreover,
there is often disagreement among the scientists themselves about the
proper use of social science data in the court system,126 and reliance
on social science risks the possibility of “reducing human beings to
data points.”127 However, we do think there is something to be
learned from those who study behavior and that such knowledge
might be helpful to courts in deciding whether to reinstate lawyers.128
V. WHY DOES THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH PERSIST W ITHOUT
REGARD TO POTENTIAL SOCIAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS?
In recent decades, courts have drawn on social science
understandings and methodologies in a wide variety of contexts.
Science-based experts testify to assist both judges and juries in
making a host of decisions in both civil and criminal trials.129 The

125. For a small sample of the literature, see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL
ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999); ROBIN FELDMAN,
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995); and Susan Haack, Irreconcilable
Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2009).
126. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011)
(providing a contemporary example where scientists disagreed about the proper use
of social science in the courtroom). For an explanation of some aspects of the
disagreement, see generally Gregory Mitchell et al., Beyond Context: Social Facts as
Case-Specific Evidence, 60 EMORY L. J. 1109 (2011).
127. FELDMAN, supra note 125, at 151–52.
128. We expressly do not suggest any particular method for courts to become
acquainted with this social science learning. We simply submit that perhaps science
can be a helpful adjuvant to courts making these difficult decisions.
129. Scientific evidence has become a prominent aspect of civil and criminal trials
in the twenty years since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was decided.
509 U.S. 529 (1993). For one commentator’s discussion of some aspects of this
change, see, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and
Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2000) (discussing the revolutionary change in science and
law following the Supreme Courts’ trilogy on expert evidence). The use of social
science in legal decision making, however, certainly is not without controversy. See,
e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 125, at 148–52 (discussing the shortcomings of the
Supreme Court’s reliance upon and understanding of science in its decisions); Rachel
F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science, and
The Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (2010) (discussing the debate over the use of
social science in Brown v. Board of Education, 498 U.S. 483 (1954), and the
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United States Supreme Court has relied on various forms of science
in reaching decisions over the last several decades.130 But science is
largely not a part of the design of the disciplinary (including
reinstatement and readmission) process. Lawyers seeking to mitigate
their punishment or seeking to reenter the profession do sometimes
offer evidence from psychologists but generally in the limited role to
explain recovery and treatment from substance abuse or mental
health disorders.131 With that exception, science is largely absent.
Focusing on lawyers who engage in deceit, we have shown that the
various forms of scientific knowledge might offer insights. Tools
might be offered to identify lawyers with serious personality and
other disorders who plainly should not be reinstated or readmitted
because they cannot be trusted at all to adhere to professional norms.
More generally, the experts might offer insights into why offending
lawyers act dishonestly in given situations, how the thought-process of
those lawyers may differ from that of others, how those thought
processes would have to change to provide greater confidence that
they will act honestly in the future, and how that change might be
achieved and identified.
We are not prescribing the use of any particular tools or suggesting
that courts should draw on any particular insights or how those
insights might change courts’ inquiry. The point is simply that
scientific knowledge likely has something to offer from which courts
have not tried to benefit. One might ask, why not? We offer the
following speculation.
There are many reasons why courts might adhere to an approach
that predates the development of the social sciences. One is that law

continuing concerns about the use of social science in the courtroom); see also
Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts: The Role of Amicus Briefs, 15
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1991).
130. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–74 (2005) (relying in part on
scientific and sociological data to support its holding that imposing the death penalty
on individuals who committed crimes while juveniles is unconstitutional); General
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring and noting the
increase in “cases presenting significant science-related issues”); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (relying on social science evidence that
segregation had a negative psychological impact on African American children). The
research upon which the Court relied in Brown has been widely critiqued. FELDMAN,
supra note 125, at 149–50.
131. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Even Judges Don’t Know Everything: A Call for

Presumption of Admissibility for Expert Witness Testimony in Lawyer Disciplinary
Proceedings, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 825, 828 n.6 (2005) (collecting cases and noting that a
common use of experts is to address health and addiction matters).
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practice is innately conservative and slow to change, particularly
absent some good reason to do so. Concepts such as stare decisis
speak to the strength of inertia when it comes to the development of
the law and legal institutions. There is a powerful force favoring the
preservation of concepts such as “character” that are deeply rooted in
the admissions and disciplinary jurisprudence. Courts may be aware,
on some level, that a foray into social science literature opens the
door to questioning the idea of “character” as a predictor of lawyers’
future behavior. Courts’ indifference to cognitive and social science
may simply bespeak resistance to change in this area.132
A second possibility is that the traditional common-law approach
to post-disciplinary proceedings more easily allows courts to mask
political considerations that they believe to be important to their
decisions.
Courts are sometimes explicit about political
considerations that enter into their decision making—e.g., that public
confidence in the legal profession sometimes precludes readmission
of disbarred lawyers with demonstrable good character because of the
nature of their prior wrongs—but they may often prefer to be opaque
about their reasoning. An approach predicated on social science
literature might give too much weight, or even a dispositive role, to
the question of whether the applicant is or is not likely to engage in
future wrongdoing, without adequate regard to other considerations
that courts would rather hide.
Finally, two other possible explanations bring us back to Julius
Henry Cohen and his conception of the central role of professional
discipline in preserving law as a “profession.”
First, the idea of “character” is not simply old and venerable. It is
also an idea intrinsic to Cohen’s conception of law as a profession.
The idea is that people are either honest or dishonest, trustworthy or
untrustworthy, law-abiding or lawless; that our character predicts our
conduct; and that the admissions and disciplinary processes will, for
the most part successfully, weed out the dishonest, untrustworthy, and

132. Courts’ adherence to long-established practice may also reflect judicial belief
that determining rehabilitation is not a terribly complex decision and is one that
judges can make based upon common sense. This intuitive style of decision-making
seems not to recognize the complexity of the judgments that courts must make in this
situation. For more on intuitive judicial decision-making, see Jane Campbell
Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude? The NAS Report and the Role of the Judiciary,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 317–19 (discussing, inter alia, judges’ intuitive decisionmaking in deciding certain types of evidentiary issues); and Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007).
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lawless among us. Part of what defines lawyers as professionals is the
presumption that, as a result of this process, they possess good
character and that clients can trust them with their valuables and
courts can take them at their word. Social science literature
potentially threatens that core idea in various ways, particularly by
exposing the fact that people are not good or bad but mostly a little of
both, and by showing that, to the extent distinctions of moral
character do exist, we and our institutions are not very good at
recognizing them.
What would follow from conceding these possibilities and
reconstructing disciplinary processes around them? The lawyer
monopoly is predicated in part on the presumption that lawyers, as
professionals, are generally more honest, trustworthy and law-abiding
than others, and in part on the presumption that lawyers have
superior skill, knowledge and expertise relevant to the law. If one
assumes that lawyers from a moral perspective are just a cross-section
of humanity, half the premise for the lawyer monopoly disappears or
weakens.
Second, judicial control over the lawyer regulatory process is
predicated on the assumption that lawyers (including judges) are
uniquely capable of policing themselves. This is because lawyers have
a better understanding of what law practice entails and, presumably, a
better ability to discern who has the requisite attributes. As to legal
skill and knowledge, that may be true. It is unlikely that judges and
lawyers can claim an ability superior to non-lawyers to assess the
“character” of applicants to the bar and of lawyers caught up in the
disciplinary process or to assess the personal traits for which the
concept of “character” may serve as a proxy. If one concedes that
social scientists are better than lawyers at fashioning a methodology
for determining which would-be lawyers are likely to act honestly in
professional dealings, at understanding why lawyers deviate, or at
identifying the situations in which lawyers are likely to deviate, the
premise of lawyer control over lawyer discipline weakens. If Cohen is
right, as discipline goes, so goes the profession.
This is not to suggest that judicial control and social science input
are necessarily inconsistent. Judges can draw on social science
insights in the disciplinary process without necessarily ceding control,
just as they draw on social science expertise in other contexts.
However, as we suggested earlier, there are mysteries at the heart of
the disciplinary process—the determination of who has been
rehabilitated being chief among them. The more these become
governed by deliberative processes informed by the social scientists
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and the less by intuitive, somewhat hidden decision making, the less
mysterious and more accessible they become, the more obvious the
courts’ limitations and fallibility become, and the weaker becomes the
bar’s claim to exclusive authority.133
In other words, Cohen was on to something when he stressed the
importance of the reciprocal relationship between professional
regulation and the preservation of the legal profession.
Reinstatement and readmission are just a small part of the regulatory
process, which includes admission, rulemaking and—the title of his
first chapter134—disbarment. But as we have shown, these small parts
of the process provide a window into the understanding of lawyer
regulation and professionalism. The courts’ adherence to the
potentially outmoded concept of “character” and methods of
discerning it in the contexts of reinstatement and readmission, and
perhaps more broadly, their indifference to possible alternative
approaches offered by the social sciences, may be rooted, at least in
part, in the interest in preserving the idea of law as a profession in the
face of perennial challenges posed in the twenty-first century no less
than in Cohen’s day.

133. For a challenge to the traditional claim, see Jonathan Macey, Occupation
Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1079, 1079–82 (2005) (“[W]hatever value self-regulation may have had
historically, the legal profession and clients would benefit from abandoning it . . . .”).
134. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 1.

